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Abstract
Katyn is a symbol of the criminal policy of the Soviet system against the Polish 
nation. The present study aims to demonstrate the basic facts of Katyn massacre – the 
execution of almost 22,000 people: Polish prisoners of war in Katyn, Kharkov, 
Kalinin (Tver) and also other Polish prisoners (soldiers and civilians), which took 
place in the spring of 1940 in different places of the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus 
republics based on the decision of the Soviet authorities, that is the Political Bureau 
of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of March 5, 1940. This article refers 
not only to the massacre itself, but also its origin, historical processes and the lies 
accompanying Katyn massacre.
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The term ‘Katyn massacre’ refers to the execution in the spring of 
1940 of almost 22,000 people: Polish prisoners of war in Katyn, Kharkov, 
Kalinin (Tver) and also prisoners (soldiers and civilians), in different places 
of the Soviet Ukraine and Belarus republics based on the decision of the 
Soviet authorities, that is the Political Bureau of All-Union Communist 
Party (Bolsheviks) of March 5, 1940. The commonly used expression 
referring to the simultaneous murders at many locations includes only the 
name of one of them, where the bodies of the officers were buried. This is 
connected with the fact that, for almost half the century after these tragic 
events, the knowledge about people taken into captivity, or arrested and 
finally murdered based on the resolution of the Political Bureau of All-
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Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), was limited to the information of 
the executions in Katyn1.
The widely understood term ‘Katyn massacre’ refers not only to the massacre 
itself, but also its origin, the lies accompanying it and attempts to judge those 
responsible for it.
1. The Soviet policy towards Poland and the Poles until 1939
The Katyn massacre committed by the People’s Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs (the NKVD) in 1940 shows how the USSR policy aimed at destroying 
Poland’s statehood since it gained independence after World War I2. The Treaty 
of Riga, which was signed in 1921 by Poland, the Soviet Russia and Ukrainian 
People’s Republic of Soviets, ended the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–1920. Under 
this treaty, the Polish eastern border was established along the following line: 
Dzisna–Dokszyce–Slucz–Korzec–Ostrog–Zbrucz. The parties dismissed 
mutual territorial claims. However, the Bolsheviks, who treated the peace 
agreement as a concession which was forced by the military situation, did not 
give up their expansion plans to the West and maintained a hostile attitude 
towards Warsaw3.
After 1921, small, specially trained groups of Ukrainian and Belarusian 
Bolsheviks and the Red Army soldiers slipped across the border from the Soviet 
Russia. They attacked police stations, civilians, clerks and set fire to forests. 
1 The intention of the authors was to summarize the most important facts connected with 
Katyn Massacre, which they gathered, among other things, when preparing the IPN educational 
portfolio ‘Katyn Massacre’ for Polish students and teachers. Its co-author is also D. Gorajczyk 
(IPN Kraków), „Zbrodnia Katyńska”, Kraków-Warszawa 2010.
2 A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, p. 12; 
W. Materski, Na widecie. II Rzeczpospolita wobec Sowietów 1918–1943, Warszawa 2005, pp. 
5–6; Polska i Ukraina w latach trzydziestych – czterdziestych XX wieku. Nieznane dokumenty 
z archiwów służb specjalnych, vol. 8: Wielki Terror: operacja polska 1937–1938 (Velykyi teror: 
pol’s’ka operatsija 1937–1938), a bilingual Polish-Ukrainian publication, collaborative work, 
Warszawa – Kijów 2010, part 1, pp. 57–59.
3 M. Iwanow, Pierwszy naród ukarany. Polacy w Związku Radzieckim 1921–1939, Warszawa–
Wrocław 1991, pp. 74–75; W. Materski, Na widecie. II Rzeczpospolita wobec Sowietów 1918–1943, 
Warszawa 2005, pp. 98–116; about the difficulties with obeying the Treaty of Riga: ibid., pp. 117–
136; Kresy pamiętamy. Z Agnieszką Biedrzycką, ks. Romanem Dzwonkowskim, Januszem Kurtyką 
i Januszem Smazą rozmawia Barbara Polak, „Biuletyn IPN” (2009), no. 1–2, pp. 16–17, 20; 
N. Davies, Boże igrzysko. Historia Polski, Kraków 1999 (God’s Playground. A History of Poland, 
vol. 2: 1797 to the Present, Oxford, 1981), pp. 863–869.
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The Creation of the Border Protection Corps in 1924 gradually restricted the 
penetration of these agents and terrorists4.
Despite the fact that talks on the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact had 
been taking place since 1926, Moscow still expressed a hostile attitude towards 
the Second Polish Republic in the second half of the twenties, by supporting 
Lithuanian territorial claims towards Poland and considering Pilsudski’s 
government ‘fascist’. After the assassination of the USSR deputy, Piotr Wojkow, 
in 1927 by a Russian emigrant, the negotiations collapsed, and the Bolsheviks 
accused the Polish government of supporting Russian emigrant organizations5.
In 1932, a pact was signed in which parties rejected the idea of war as an 
international policy tool, accepted one another’s obligations and declared that 
if any party was attacked, no help would be offered to the aggressor. The pact 
was to be in force for three years, but in 1934 both the Bolsheviks and the Polish 
government decided to prolong this period to ten years in the face of the danger 
from Germany ruled by the Nazi party6.
One of the crucial factors which influenced the relations between Moscow 
and Warsaw was the situation of about one million Poles who, after the 
Treaty of Riga was signed, remained beyond the eastern border7. The USSR 
government created two ethnic regions for them: Julian Marchlewski Polish 
Autonomous District (Marchlewszczyzna) in Ukraine in 1925, and Feliks 
Dzierzynski Polish Autonomous District (Dzierzynszczyzna) in Belarus 
in 1932. The aim of the Bolsheviks’ policy in these districts was to form 
units which were to participate in the aggression against the Second Polish 
Republic in the future. The ‘national experiment’ was a failure because 
the inhabitants of both districts preserved national and Catholic traditions 
and in the 1930’s strongly opposed collectivization. In 1935 the decision to 
dissolve Marchlewszczyzna was announced. Based on the act of the Council 
of People’s Commissars of 28 April 1936, the deportation of  masses of 
4 W. Materski, Na widecie. II Rzeczpospolita wobec Sowietów 1918–1943, Warszawa 2005, 
pp. 257–261, 278–280, 421–422; M. Rataj, Pamiętniki 1918–1927, comp. J. Dębski, Warszawa 1965, 
p. 208.
5 W. Materski, Na widecie. II Rzeczpospolita wobec Sowietów 1918–1943, Warszawa 2005, 
pp. 295, 305–307, 310–324.
6 W. Materski, Na widecie. II Rzeczpospolita wobec Sowietów 1918–1943, Warszawa 2005, 
pp. 380–398, 443–446.
7 Kresy pamiętamy. Z Agnieszką Biedrzycką, ks. Romanem Dzwonkowskim, Januszem 
Kurtyką i Januszem Smazą rozmawia Barbara Polak, „Biuletyn IPN” (2009), no 1–2, p. 19.
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Marchlewszczyzna citizens to Siberia and Kazakhstan started8. According 
to final reports prepared by the NKVD, about 50,000 people were forced to 
leave their country. In 1938 Dzierzynszczyzna met with the same fate and it 
is estimated that about 20,000 people were deported. 
During the years of the great terror 1937–1938, which affected the inhabitants 
of the whole USSR, an attack on the Poles who lived in the Soviet Ukraine and 
Belarus occurred. Based on the order issued on 11 August, 1937 by Nikolai 
Yezhov, an internal affairs commissar, the so-called Polish Operation of the 
NKVD began9. This meant arrests, and executions based on false accusations 
of spy and sabotage activities. From August 1937 till September 1938, 144,000 
Poles were judged, among whom 111,000 were shot by the NKVD, and almost 
30,000 were sent to labour camps or prisons after receiving five to fifteen year 
sentences10.
The hostility of the USSR authorities towards the Poles during the period 
between the wars originated, among other things, from the desire to take 
revenge for the defeat of the Red Army at the Polish-Bolshevik War in 1920 and 
preventing the army from advancing towards the west11.
8 H. Stroński, Nieudany eksperyment. Treść, formy i skutki sowietyzacji ludności polskiej 
na Ukrainie w latach dwudziestych i trzydziestych XX wieku, in: Polska droga do Kazachstanu. 
Materiały z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej, Żytomierz 12–14 October 1996, T. Kisielewski, 
ed., Warszawa 1998, p. 7–23; H. Stroński, Koniec eksperymentu. Rozwiązanie Marchlewszczyzny 
i deportacje ludności polskiej do Kazachstanu w latach 1935–1936 w świetle nowych dokumentów 
archiwalnych, „Ucrainica-Polonica”, Kijów 2007, no. 1, pp. 201–220.
9 Polska i Ukraina w latach trzydziestych – czterdziestych XX wieku. Nieznane dokumenty 
z archiwów służb specjalnych, vol. 8: Wielki Terror: operacja polska 1937–1938 (Velykyi teror: 
pol’s’ka operatsija 1937–1938), a bilingual Polish-Ukrainian publication, collaborative work, 
Warszawa – Kijów 2010, part 1, pp. 257–263.
10 T. Snyder, Skrwawione ziemie, Warszawa 2011, pp. 111–126, (T. Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe 
between Hitler and Stalin, New York 2010); A. Paczkowski, Polacy pod obcą i własną przemocą, in: 
Czarna księga komunizmu. Zbrodnie, terror, prześladowania, collaborative work, Warszawa 1999, 
pp. 341–366 (The Black Book of Communism. Crimes, Terror, Repression, London 1999; Polska 
i Ukraina w latach trzydziestych – czterdziestych XX wieku. Nieznane dokumenty z archiwów służb 
specjalnych, vol. 8: Wielki Terror: operacja polska 1937–1938 (Velykyi teror: pol’s’ka operatsija 
1937–1938), a bilingual Polish-Ukrainian publication, collaborative work Warszawa – Kijów 2010, 
part 1, pp. 63–71; M. Ellman, Stalin and Soviet Famine of 1932–33 Revisited, „Europe and Asia 
Studies” (2007), vol. 59, no 4, pp. 686–687; N. Pietrow, Polska operacja NKWD, „Karta” 1993, no. 
11, pp. 24–45; One of the papers dealing with the Polish Operation of the NKVD is Rozstrzelać 
Polaków: ludobójstwo Polaków w Związku Sowieckim w latach 1937–1938: dokumenty z centrali, 
comp. T. Sommer, Warszawa 2010.
11 A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, p. 30 (Katyn: Stalin’s 
massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991).
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2. The Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939
In the morning of 17 September, 1939, between 600–650,000 soldiers and 
over 5,000 thousand Red Army tanks invaded the Second Polish Republic, 
which had been fighting against German aggression since 1 September12. 
On 23 August, 1939, the USSR and the Third Reich signed a pact, which 
was named the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact after its signatories, the ministers 
of foreign affairs of both countries. According to the confidential protocol 
of this non-aggression pact, the USSR’s sphere of influence was to extend 
approximately to the Narew, Vistula and San rivers. This state of affairs was 
confirmed in the treaty of 28 September and another protocol accompanying 
it, according to which German and Soviet parties committed themselves to 
fighting ‘Polish agitation’13.
The invasion of the Red Army took place at the time when the Polish forces 
were retreating eastwards before the Germans, after an unsuccessful attempt 
to maintain the territory to the Narew, Vistula nad San rivers. According to 
Edward Rydz-Smigly’s military plan, the remaining units were to gather at the 
so-called Romanian Bridgehead and continue defence until France and Great 
Britain launched an offensive in the West. They declared war on Germany on 
3 September under their obligations towards Poland from before 1 September. 
As a result of the decision of 12 September, which was taken by the French-
English Supreme Council of War, the allies did not take any military action, 
and the Red Army invaded Poland on the pretext that ‘the Polish country and 
its government ceased to exist’. Consequently, ‘the USSR had to take care 
of the people who lived in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus and their 
12 Agresja sowiecka na Polskę w świetle dokumentów. 17 września 1939, vol. 1: Geneza i skutki, 
vol. 2: Działania wojsk Frontu Ukraińskiego, vol. 3: Działania wojsk Frontu Białoruskiego, 
comp. C. Grzelak, S. Jaczyński, E. Kozłowski, Warszawa 1994–1996, passim; N. Davies, Boże 
igrzysko. Historia Polski, Kraków 1999 (God’s Playground. A History of Poland, vol. 2: 1797 
to the Present, Oxford, 1981), p. 901; J. Łojek, Agresja 17 września 1939. Studium aspektów 
politycznych, Warszawa 1990, passim; W. K. Roman, J. Tucholski, Obóz w Starobielsku, in: 
Charków. Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. J. Ciesielski et al., 
Warszawa 2003, pp. XIII–XXIV.
13 Agresja sowiecka na Polskę 17 września 1939 w świetle dokumentów, vol. 1, Geneza 
i skutki agresji, E. Kozłowski, ed., Warszawa 1994, pp. 87–90; Z. S. Siemaszko, W sowieckim 
osaczeniu 1939–1943, Londyn 1991, pp. 17–21; R. Szawłowski, Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1939, vol. 
2 – dokumenty, Warszawa 1997, p. 15; Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, 
N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, pp. 39–42.
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possessions’ as the Soviet propaganda referred to the eastern regions of the 
Second Polish Republic14.
The commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, Marshal Smigly-Rydz ordered 
the army to abstain from provocative operations against the Soviets and 
allowed the possibility of war in case ‘they invaded Poland or tried to disarm 
the detachments’15. Those instructions were issued in Kuty, where politicians, 
commanders, soldiers and civilians escaped across the bridge in Czeremosz to 
the Romanian bank.
People from Wilno (Vilnius) and Grodno and the group of Border Protection 
Corps resisted the enemy attack. The corps under Wilhelm Orlik-Rückemann’s 
command fought the battle of Szack against the 52 Rifle Division of the Red 
Army. By 25 September, as a result of Belarusian Front attack, the Soviets had 
gained possession of Wilno (Vilnius), Grodno, Brześć (Brest) on the River Bug 
and Suwalki. By 28 September, the soldiers of Belarusian Front had occupied 
Tarnopol, Dubno, Stanislawow, Lwów (Lviv) and Zamosc. The USSR gained 
control of over half of the territory of the Second Polish Republic16.
As soon as the Red Army crossed the border, it started to commit crimes: 
the massacre in Grodno and the assassination of General Jozef Olszyna-
Wilczynski, the execution of marines of the Pinsk Flotilla in Mokrany, murders 
in Nowogrodek, Tarnopol and other places, the execution of the soldiers 
taken captive near Wilno (Vilnius), and also the arrest of defenders of Lwów 
(Lviv). This happened despite the agreement which guaranteed defenders of 
Lwów (Lviv) safe conduct towards the Romanian border17. Behind the army, 
14 Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., 
New Haven 2007, pp. 21–22, 44–45; „Prawda”, no. 259, 18 September 1939; P. Wieczorkiewicz, 
Polska w planach Stalina w latach 1935–1945, in: W objęciach wielkiego brata. Sowieci w Polsce 
1944–1993, K. Rokicki, S. Stępień, eds., Warszawa 2009, pp. 29–31.
15 Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New 
Haven 2007, p. 48; J. Łojek, Agresja 17 września 1939. Studium aspektów politycznych, Warszawa 
1990, pp. 100–107; R. Szawłowski, Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1939, vol. 1 – monograph, Warszawa 
1997, pp. 43–47; P. Wieczorkiewicz, Historia polityczna Polski 1935–1945, Warszawa 2005, p. 96.
16 Cz. Grzelak, Kresy w czerwieni. Agresja Związku Sowieckiego na Polskę w 1939 roku, 
Warszawa 1998, pp. 228–415; K. Liszewski, Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1939 r., Londyn 1988, p. 26; 
P. Wieczorkiewicz, Kampania 1939, Warszawa 2001, pp. 93–113; W przeddzień zbrodni katyńskiej: 
agresja sowiecka 1939 roku, M. Tarczyński, ed. „Zeszyty Katyńskie” (1999), no. 10.
17 J. W. Dyskant, Flotylla Rzeczna Marynarki Wojennej wobec agresji sowieckiej we wrześniu 
1939 r., „Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny” (1992), no. 3, pp. 3–33; K. Pindel, Obrona Narodowa 
1937–1939, Warszawa 1979, p. 191; W. K. Roman, J. Tucholski, Obóz w Starobielsku, in: Charków. 
Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. J. Ciesielski et al., Warszawa 2003, pp. 
XV–XIX.
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operational-chekist groups of the NKVD followed, which murdered and arrested 
Polish people. These units formed the security apparatus in occupied places, 
gained control over the state archives, radio and telephone communications and 
they disarmed civilians. The units acted in accordance with the directive issued 
by the NKVD on ‘The Organisation of Work in Liberated Regions of Western 
Districts of Ukraine and Belarus’ of 15 September, 193918. About 230,000 
soldiers and officers and thousands of military service representatives were 
taken captive by the Bolsheviks. In the majority of cases soldiers and officers 
did not oppose it. Privates were separated from officers who were transported 
to Kozelsk and Starobelsk. Policemen were transported mainly to Ostashkov19.
3. Camps
Kozelsk
Kozelsk camp was created in the buildings of a former monastery, the so-
called Optina Hermitage. There were 4,594 captives there, about half of whom 
were reserve officers. There were also over 300 doctors, several hundred lawyers, 
engineers, teachers, 21 university lecturers, a lot of men of letters, journalists 
and feature writers. There was one woman among them: Second Lieutenant 
Pilot Janina Lewandowska, General Jozef-Dowbor-Musnicki’s daughter. The 
following people were kept there: Rear-admiral Ksawery Czernicki – chief of 
services of Naval Forces management; General Henryk Odrowaz-Minkiewicz 
– the former commander of Border Protection Corps; General Mieczyslaw 
Smorawinski – commander of Corps District No 2 in Lublin; retired Generals 
Bronislaw Bohaterewicz and Jerzy Wolkowicki, and Professor Stanislaw 
Swianiewicz, who avoided death and played a significant role in uncovering 
Katyn massacre, its initiators and executors20.
18 Śladem zbrodni katyńskiej, comp. Z. Gajowniczek, Warszawa 1998, pp. 17–19.
19 Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New 
Haven 2007, pp. 25–35; A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 
2010, pp. 49–72; Z. S. Siemaszko, W sowieckim osaczeniu 1939–1943, Londyn 1991, pp. 36–57.
20 S. Swianiewicz, W cieniu Katynia, Warszawa 1990, p. 97 (In the Shadow of Katyn: Stalin’s 
terror, Pender Island 2002); J. K. Zawodny, Zbrodnia Katyńska, in: Księga Cmentarna Polskiego 
Cmentarza Wojennego w Katyniu, comp. J. Kiński et al., Warszawa 2000, pp. XXI–XXX; Lista jeńców 
obozu w Kozielsku zamordowanych w Lesie Katyńskim w kwietniu i maju 1940 r. spoczywających na 
polskim Cmentarzu Wojennym w Katyniu, in: Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego 
w Katyniu, comp. J. Kiński et al., Warszawa 2000, pp. 44, 93, 343, 404, 578; the whole cemetery 
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Starobelsk
In Starobelsk the prisoners of war were kept in a former nunnery at 8 Kirov 
Street, in the buildings at 32 Kirov Street and 19 Wolodarski Street. There 
were 3,894 people there: a lot of scholars, priests, about 100 teachers and 400 
doctors, several hundred lawyers and engineers, several dozen of men of letters 
and journalists, and also 8 generals: the defender of Lwów (Lviv) Franciszek 
Sikorski, Konstanty Plisowski, Stanisław Haller, Leonard Skierski, Leon 
Billewicz, Aleksander Kowalewski, Kazimierz Orlik-Lukoski and Piotr 
Skuratowicz21.
Ostashkov
The prisoners were kept in a former monastery on Stolobny Island on 
Seliger Lake, 11 kilometres from Ostashkov. Among the prisoners were the 
following: the State Police and Military Police officials, secret service and 
counter-espionage officials, the soldiers of the Border Protection Corps and 
the employees of the Prison Guard. There were also almost the whole staff of 
the Military Police Education Centre, among whom was Colonel Stanislaw 
Sitek. Ostashkov camp was the biggest of the three camps – there were about 
6,570 prisoners of war just before it was disbanded in April 194022.
book is also available on the Internet: www.10pul.idl.pl/pliki/katyn/katyn_ksiega_cmentarna_cz1.
pdf, www.10pul.idl.pl/pliki/katyn/katyn_ksiega_cmentarna_cz2.pdf, www.10pul.idl.pl/pliki/katyn/
katyn_ksiega_cmentarna_cz3.pdf (03.04.2013); A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. 
Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 72–76; J. K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story of Katyn 
Forest Massacre, London 1971, pp. 101–162. General Jerzy Wolkowicki and Stanislaw Swianiewicz 
survived.
21 W. K. Roman, J. Tucholski, Obóz w Starobielsku, in: Charków. Księga Cmentarna Polskiego 
Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. J. Ciesielski et al., Warszawa 2003, pp. XI–XIII, XXIV–LII; Jeńcy 
obozu w Starobielsku zamordowani w siedzibie charkowskiego Zarządu NKWD w kwietniu i maju 
1940 r. spoczywający na Polskim Cmentarzu Wojennym w Charkowie, in: Charków. Księga 
Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. J. Ciesielski et al., Warszawa 2003, pp. 31, 
158, 252, 315, 420, 483, 488, 493; the whole cemetery book is also available on the Internet: www.
radaopwim.gov.pl/media/pliki/Ksiega_Cmentarna_Charkow.pdf (03.04.2013); A. Przewoźnik, 
J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 76–81; E. Gruner-Żarnoch, 
Starobielsk w oczach ocalałych jeńców, Dziekanów Leśny 2009.
22 Z. Gajowniczek, B. Gronek, Więźniowie Ostaszkowa, in: Miednoje. Księga Cmentarna 
Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. Z. Gajowniczek et al., vol. 1–2, Warszawa 2006, p. XXVI–
XXXIV; Jeńcy obozu w Ostaszkowie zamordowani przez NKWD wiosną 1940 r. w Kalininie, 
spoczywający na Polskim Cmentarzu Wojennym w Miednoje, in: Księga Cmentarna Polskiego 
Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. Z. Gajowniczek et al, vol. 1–2, Warszawa 2006, p. 808; the whole 
cemetery book is also available on the Internet: www.radaopwim.gov.pl/media/pliki/Ksiega_Cmen 
tarna_Miednoje_Tom1.pdf, www.radaopwim.gov.pl/media/pliki/Ksiega_Cmentarna_Miednoje_
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4. The massacre
Preparations for the massacre
From October 1939, the delegated NKVD officials from Moscow heard the 
prisoners, encouraged them to cooperate and collected data. Only a few of the 
prisoners agreed to collaborate. The commanding officers’ reports included 
opinions about hostile attitudes of the Poles and a minimal chance of them 
being useful to the USSR authorities23.
The decision to shoot the prisoners from Kozelsk, Starobelsk and 
Ostashkov was signed on 5 March, 1940 by seven members of the All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) authorities: Joseph Stalin, Lavrentiy Beria 
(proposer), Kliment Voroshilov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan, 
Mikhail Kalinin and Lazar Kaganovich24. On 22 March, Beria issued an 
order ‘to empty the NKVD prisons in USSR and BSSR, that is in Western 
Ukraine and Western Belarus. The majority of those arrested Poles were 
officers and policemen25.
The lists of those sent to death were to be prepared and signed by Piotr 
Soprunienko, commander-in-chief of the Prisoners of War Board of People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which was created by the order of Beria in 
September 193926.
On 1 April, the first three lists of the 343 names were sent from Moscow 
to Ostaskhov camp. Later Soprunienko phoned the following commanding 
Tom2.pdf (03.04.2013); A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 
2010, pp. 81–85.
23 A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2003, pp. 75–86 (Katyn: 
Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991); N. Lebedeva, The Tragedy 
of Katyn, “International Affairs”, Moscow 1990; N. Lebiediewa, Katyń – zbrodnia przeciwko 
ludzkości, Warszawa 1997.
24 Katyń. Dokumenty ludobójstwa, dokumenty i materiały archiwalne przekazane Polsce 
14 października 1992 r., trans. W. Majerski, Warszawa 1992, pp. 27–28, 35–42; Katyn. A Crime 
Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, pp. 
118–120.
25 Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New 
Haven 2007, p. 154–156; Listy katyńskiej ciąg dalszy. Straceni na Ukrainie. Lista obywateli polskich 
zamordowanych na Ukrainie na podstawie decyzji Biura Politycznego WKP (b) i naczelnych władz 
państwowych ZSRR z 5 marca 1940 roku, Warszawa 1994.
26 S. Jaczyński, Zagłada oficerów Wojska Polskiego na Wschodzie, wrzesień 1939 – maj 1940, 
Edition II, Warszawa 2006; A. Głowacki, Jeńcy września w niewoli sowieckiej 1939 r. Przed 
zagładą, „Zeszyty Katyńskie”, no. 10 (1999), pp. 24–68.
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officers: Wasilij Korolew in Kozelsk, Aleksander Bierezkow in Starobelsk 
and Pawel Borisowiec in Ostaskhov in order to submit further lists of 
victims27.
5. Places of torture – cemeteries
Smolensk–Katyn
On 3 April, the first prisoners from Kozelsk were transported in cattle 
trucks through Smolensk to Gniezdovo, where smaller groups were transported 
by prison cars commonly called ‘czornyje worony’ (‘black ravens’) to the 
wilderness called Kozie Gory in Katyn Forest. The functionaries of the 
NKVD killed each person by shooting in the back of the head. By 11 May, 
1940, 4,421 Polish citizens had been killed and buried in Katyn death pits. 
There is an assumption that some officers had been killed in Smolensk28.
Kharkov–Piatykhatky
The first group of prisoners from Starobelsk camp was transported to the 
headquarters of the Board of Kharkov NKVD district on 5 April 1940. Every 
night in the basement of the building in Dscherschinski Street executioners 
killed prisoners by shooting in the neck. The trucks carried the bodies to the 
pits in Forest Park in Kharkov, a kilometer and a half to Piatykhatky village. 
By 12 May 3,820 Polish citizens had been killed in Kharkov29.
27 Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New 
Haven 2007, pp. 157–159.
28 Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego w Katyniu, comp. J. Kiński et al., 
Warszawa 2000; A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2003, pp. 103–
116 (Katyn: Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991); For Stanisław 
Swianiewicz’s report, refer to The Katyn Forest massacre. Hearings before the Select Committee 
to conduct an investigation of the facts evidence and circumstances of the Katyn Forest massacre, 
Washington 1951–1952, part. 4, p. 111; Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów (including 
the foreword by general W. Anders), Londyn 1982, pp. 47–49 (The Crime of Katyn: Facts and 
Documents, London 1989).
29 Katyń. Dokumenty zbrodni, A. Gieysztor, R.G. Pichoja, eds., vol. 2: Zagłada, A. Gieysztor, 
W. Kozłow, eds., Warszawa 1998, pp. 475, 486, 489; Charków. Księga Cmentarna Polskiego 
Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. J. Ciesielski et al., Warszawa 2003; J. Morawski, Ślad kuli, 
Warszawa–Londyn 1992, pp. 96–97, 104–128.
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Kalinin (Tver)–Miednoye
On 4 April, 1940, the NKVD started to send prisoners from Ostashkov 
to the headquarters of the Board of Kalinin NKVD district (today’s Tver) 
at 6 Soviet Street. The executions took place in the basements. The same 
method of killing was used: a shot to the neck. In the mornings trucks carried 
the bodies to the pits in Miednoye village, 30 kilometers further away. By 22 
May, 1940, 6,311 Polish citizens had been killed in Kalinin. What is worth 
mentioning when it comes to the Katyn lie, is that the territory of Miednoye 
cemetery has never belonged to Germany30.
Polish authorities built war cemeteries at the places where the officers’ 
bodies had been buried. The cemeteries were officially opened in the year 
2000. (in Kharkov on 17 June, in Katyn on 28 July and on 2 September in 
Miednoye)31.
Survivors
Only 395 people from the three camps survived. Some of them owed their 
rescue to pure chance. Several people were willing to fight on the Soviet side 
in case of German invasion. There were also agents among them, the same 
ones as the NKVD had in the camps. The officers who were arrested in the 
camps and transported to NKVD Lubyanka prison in Moscow also managed 
to escape death in the summer of 194032.
30 Z. Gajowniczek, B. Gronek, Więźniowie Ostaszkowa, in: Miednoje. Księga Cmentarna 
Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. Z. Gajowniczek et al., vol. 1, Warszawa 2006, pp. XXXIX–
XLV; Miednoje. Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. Z. Gajowniczek et al., 
vol. 1–2, Warszawa 2006; J. Morawski, Ślad kuli, Warszawa–Londyn 1992, pp. 95–96; Zeznanie 
Tokariewa, „Zeszyty Katyńskie” (1994), no. 3.
31 A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 
449–528; A. Przewoźnik, Cmentarz w Katyniu, in: Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza 
Wojennego w Katyniu, comp. J. Kiński et al., Warszawa 2000, pp. LIII–LX; A. Przewoźnik, 
Cmentarz w Charkowie, in: Charków. Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. 
J. Ciesielski et al., Warszawa 2003, pp. LVII–LXXV; A. Przewoźnik, Cmentarz w Miednoje, in: 
Miednoje. Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza Wojennego, comp. Z. Gajowniczek et al., vol. 
1–2, Warszawa 2006, pp. LI–LXXVII; Charków, Katyń, Miednoje. Polskie cmentarze wojenne. 
Polish war cemetery. Polskoe voennoe memorialnoe kladbishche, A. Spanili, ed., Gdynia 2000.
32 N. Lebiediewa, Katyń – zbrodnia przeciwko ludzkości, Warszawa 1997, p. 171; Katyń. 
Dokumenty zbrodni, A. Gieysztor, R.G. Pichoja, eds., vol. 2: Zagłada, A. Gieysztor, ed., W. Kozłow, 
Warszawa 1998, p. 351; A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 
2010, p. 120; J. K. Zawodny,  Zbrodnia Katyńska, in: Księga Cmentarna Polskiego Cmentarza 
Wojennego w Katyniu, comp. J. Kiński et al., Warszawa 2000, p. XL.
The Person and the Challenges 
Volume 3 (2013) Number 2, p. 65–9276
6. Ukrainian list, Belorusian list
The NKVD kept several thousand arrested officers, clerks, judges, prosecutors, 
political and social activists in prisons in the so-called Western Ukraine and 
Western Belarusia. 7,300 of them were put to death. There were 3,435 names of 
people on the so-called Ukrainian list, which was given to Poland by the Security 
Service of Ukraine in 1994. The people were killed after being transported, among 
others, from Lwów (Lviv), Rowne, Luck, Tarnopol, Stanislawow and Drohobycz 
to Kiev, Kharkov and Cherson. The data of the victims – about 3,870 prisoners 
transported from Pinsk, Brest, Baranowicze and Wilejka to Minsk – from the 
so-called Belarusian list have never been revealed and attempts by the Polish 
authorities to make the archives available have been unsuccessful so far33.
Ukraine – Bykivnia
At least 1,980 people people from the Ukrainian list were killed and buried 
in Bykivnia village near Kiev, where about 150 thousand NKVD victims of 
various nationalities were buried. When the Ukrainian authorities passed the 
information about Bykivnia cemetery to Warsaw in 2006, both countries started 
to study it34. The dog tag found in 2007 is considered to be the most important 
piece of evidence concerning the burial of Polish officers. The dog tag, which 
was a small piece of metal with soldiers’ personal data, was worn around the 
neck by them so that they could be identified in case they were injured or killed. 
The dog tag which was found in the grave in Bykivina had been made according 
to the standard from the year 1939, and belonged to Company Sergeant Jozef 
Naglik. On the comb unearthed were the names of the four soldiers, among 
whom was the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Bronislaw Szczyradlowski. The 
names Naglik and Szczyradlowski are on the so-called Ukrainian list. The 
Polish War Cemetery in Bykivnia was opened on 21 September, 201235.
Belarus – Kuropaty
In 1988, mass graves were discovered in Kuropaty Forest, in the suburbs 
of Minsk, where the NKVD buried between 100–200,000 Belarusians, Jews 
33 J. Gorelik, Kuropaty. Polski ślad, Warszawa 1996; S. Kalbarczyk, Białoruska lista katyńska 
– brakujący element prawdy o Zbrodni Katyńskiej, „Zeszyty Katyńskie”, no. 23 (2008), pp. 135–
145; A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 532–562.
34 A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 546–550.
35 Polski Cmentarz Wojenny w Kijowie-Bykowni (Czwarty Cmentarz Katyński), Warszawa 2012.
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and people of various nationalities, including the Poles. The things found in the 
three mass graves indicate that they must have come from Poland or Western 
Europe36, for example a comb on which a prisoner had scratched Polish words: 
‘Difficult prisoner’s moments. Minsk, 25.4.1940. Thinking about you drives me 
crazy. I have started to cry – a difficult day.’ This shows that, firstly, the Poles 
were buried there, and, secondly, they were in Minsk prison at the time when the 
NKVD carried out Katyn massacre37. However, it is impossible to find out the 
personal data of the owner of the comb and even if it were possible, one cannot 
compare them with the Belarusian list, which is still unknown to the Polish side. 
The Belaursian authorities claim that those who are buried there were murdered 
by the Germans, and make careful research difficult. In the year 2013, the Centre 
for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding made a reconstruction of part 
of the so-called Belarusian Katyn list and created a list of 98 names. This was 
done by comparing the list of the people missing in the north-east districts of 
the Second Polish Republic in 1939 and 1940 with the NKVD convoy list of the 
people transported to Minsk prison in the years 1939–194038.
7. To exterminate Polish elites
There are mass graves in the whole area of the former Soviet Union. Stalin 
and other leading Bolshevik activists before him ordered the elimination of 
whole social classes – Russian intelligence and rich farmers, the so-called 
kulaks; superior servicemen and workers; aristocrats and their servants. They 
sentenced members of different professions to death, for example, doctors and 
generals and exterminated people of various nationalities: Russians, Poles, 
Ukrainians, Belarusians, Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Finns, Estonians, 
Latvians, Chinese – the list is endless39.
36 S. Kalbarczyk, Białoruska lista katyńska – brakujący element prawdy o Zbrodni Katyńskiej, 
„Zeszyty Katyńskie” (2008), no. 23, pp. 135–145.
37 J. Gorelik, Kuropaty. Polski ślad, Warszawa 1996.
38 www.cprdip.pl/main/index.php?id=fragment-rekonstrukcji-bialoruskiej-listy-katynskiej 
(03.04.2013).
39 A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 47–52, 101–109, 
111–127, 129–131 (Katyn: Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991); 
R. Pipes, Komunizm, Warszawa 2008, pp. 59–63, (Communism, London 2001); N. Davies, Europa. 
Rozprawa historyka z historią, Kraków 1998, pp. 989, 1020–1025 (N. Davies, Europe. A History, 
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The massacre committed in the spring of 1940 was carefully considered 
and organized. The aim of the communist party was the extermination of those 
social groups which had been building the bases of the modern Polish nation 
since the mid-nineteenth century40.
A modern collective national consciousness was developed. This was 
possible thanks to the intellectual elite’s work on improving the conditions of 
life among peasantry, industrial workers or craftsmen and educated people’s 
attempts to involve those from lower classes of society in social life. Owing to 
the landed gentry’s and intellectual elite’s, care and effort to continue Polish 
traditions and culture were of interest to more and more social layers of Poles. 
The burghers, which was becoming richer and richer, developed modern 
industry by creating economic structures, on which – Poland reborn after the 
partition – built its economy41.
The social classes which remained passive during the uprisings in the 19th 
century took an active part in the fight for independence. After Poland gained 
independence in 1918, subsequent generations of intellectual elite created 
structures of an independent country, which was developing in all spheres of life42.
By carrying out the Katyn massacre, the Soviets got rid of large numbers 
of teachers, doctors, industrialists, engineers, humanists, writers, scholars, and 
also a lot of professional officers: the elites capable of rebuilding the country. 
Polish people who were a threat to the plans of the conquest of Poland, because 
they were determined to oppose the annexation of their country by Moscow and 
suspected in being involved in any anti-Soviet conspiracy found themselves in 
Oxford 1996); P. Johnson, Historia świata (od roku 1917), London 1989, pp. 76–80 (History of the 
Modern World: From 1917 to the 1980’s, London 1983).
40 J. Czapski, Wspomnienia starobielskie, in: Na nieludzkiej ziemi, Kraków 2011, pp. 10–12, 17–
21, 23–33 (Ricordi di Starobielsk, Roma 1945; Souvenirs de Starobielsk, Paris 1987); J. Mackiewicz, 
Sprawa mordu katyńskiego. Ta książka była pierwsza, Londyn 2009, p. 167 (Katyn – ungesühntes 
Verbrechen, Zurich 1949; The Katyn Wood Murders, London 1951); T. Snyder, Skrwawione ziemie, 
Warszawa 2011, pp. 147, 176 (T. Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin, New York 
2010); A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 13–14, 96–99 
(Katyn: Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991); A. Przewoźnik, 
J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 11–15, 75– 82.
41 H. Wereszycki, Historia polityczna Polski 1864–1918, Kraków 1981, pp. 7–9, 322–329.
42 By using the example of Markowa, Szpytma M. describes how big influence Katyn massacre 
had on even small communities, for example village communities Pars pro toto. Katyńczycy 
z Markowej – major Antoni Fleszar i kapitan Władysław Ciekot, „Zeszyty Historyczne WiN-u” no. 
32–33 z XII 2010, pp. 91–113; after the article was published, it turned out that another victim was 
connected with this place, Captain Franciszek Michnar, whose name is on the Ukrainian Katyn List.
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the hands of the NKVD. Mobilized reserve officers, not only the Poles, but 
also Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Tatars and people of various nationalities 
living in the Second Polish Republic constituted over half of the victims43.
The plan of the destruction of people in the eastern part of the Polish Republic 
also included forced deportations, which were organized by the NKVD to 
faraway places in the USSR. The first of them took place from 9 to 11 February, 
1940 and included, among others, military settlers, civil servants, workers of 
the forest services and Polish State Railways. The second deportation took place 
from 12 to 14 April, 1940. It included family members of those considered to 
be enemies of communism: office workers, police and prison officers, teachers, 
social activists, captives’ families and those repressed by the NKVD and 
killed in Katyn massacre. On 28 and 29 June, 1940, war refugees from central 
Poland were deported. The fourth deportation took place in May and June 1941. 
It included intellectuals, captives, labourers, craftsmen, families of railway 
workers and of those arrested since autumn 1940. The captives were deported 
to different republics of the USSR: Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Uzbek, 
and also Russian (for example to Siberia). According to the Soviet documents 
that have been published so far, the number of Polish people deported in the 
years 1940–1941 is at least 309–327,000 citizens44.
8. Search for Polish officers and Stalin’s lies
The last pieces of news that the families received from the prisoners were 
from the beginnings of March 1940. Later, the NKVD denied any information. 
43 G. Hryciuk, Victims 1939–1941: The Soviet Repressions in Eastern Poland, in: E. Barkan, 
E. A. Cole, K. Struve, ed., Shared History – Divided Memory: Jews and Others in the Soviet-
Occupied Poland, Leipzig 2007, pp. 179–180; Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, 
N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, p. 26; K. Jasiewicz, Drugie dno zbrodni 
katyńskiej, „Uważam Rze. Historia” 2012, no. 1.
44 W. Materski, Katyń. Od kłamstwa ku prawdzie, Warszawa 2012, pp. 67–74; A. Przewoźnik, 
J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 168–177; A. Paul, Katyń. 
Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 117–133, 150–157, 167–179 (Katyn: 
Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991); before the Russian 
archives were opened, the number of deported people was estimated to be approximately 1,200,000 
according to the Polish emigration historiography, refer to: J. K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. 
The Story of Katyn Forest Massacre, London 1971, p. 5 (based on: Polskie Siły Zbrojne w Drugiej 
Wojnie Światowej, Komisja Historyczna Polskiego Sztabu głównego w Londynie, London 1950–
1951; nowadays some historians emphasize that the number of people deported has been calculated 
based only on the Soviet documents published so far, and it may be much bigger).
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At the same time, the post started to return the letters to the officers sent by their 
families from the General Government45.
After the German invasion of the USSR, the Polish-Soviet relations were 
re-established, after they had been broken off on 17 September, 1939. On 30 
July, 1941, Sikorski-Majski Pact was signed by the prime minister of the Polish 
government-in-exile and Moscow ambassador in London. Under this pact an 
army was to be formed, which would consist of the Poles staying in the USSR. 
It also provided – as it was called – the amnesty for all citizens of the Republic 
of Poland, who were, at that time, ‘deprived of freedom in the USSR, either as 
prisoners of war or according to any other corresponding rules’46.
The commander-in-chief in exile appointed General Wladyslaw Anders, 
who was released from Lubyanka prison in Moscow, the commander of Polish 
Armed Forces in the USSR. The former prisoners of gulags and also the Poles 
living in the Soviet Union traversed long distances in very difficult conditions 
in order to reach Tatiszczew near Saratow, Buzuluk and Totskoye (Orenburg 
district), where those ready to join Anders’ Army gathered47. All the people who 
arrived, both from the distant north and Siberia and from the European part 
of the empire asked about their commanders. Cavalry Captain, Jozef Czapski, 
the survivor of Starobelsk camp, a writer and painter and also a representative 
on the matter of the missing people, had gathered information about the Poles 
staying in the USSR and interceded with the Soviets. In the autumn of 1941, 
General Anders passed the authorities in Moscow a list of officers who were 
taken captive by the Red Army in 1939 and could be in gulags. A high number 
of the missing people, which was estimated to be about 15,000 at that time, 
excluded their accidental arrest in labour camps. Anders mentioned this during 
the conversation with Jozef Stalin and received the following reply: ‘They fled 
to Manchuria’48.
45 A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 177–
178; J. Mackiewicz, Sprawa mordu katyńskiego. Ta książka była pierwsza, Londyn 2009, pp. 157, 
219–220 (Katyn – ungesühntes Verbrechen, Zurich 1949; The Katyn Wood Murders, London 1951).
46 A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 188–191 (Katyn: 
Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991); Stosunki Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej z państwem radzieckim 1918–1943. Wybór dokumentów, comp. J. Komaniecki, Warszawa 
1991, p. 245; J. K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story of Katyn Forest Massacre, London 
1971, p. 6.
47 W. Anders, Bez ostatniego rozdziału. Wspomnienia z lat 1939–1946, part 1, Lublin 1988, p. 76.
48 Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów (including the foreword by general W. Anders), 
Londyn 1980, pp. 64–84 (The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents, London 1989); J. Mackiewicz, 
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9. The Germans discover the graves in Katyn
After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Germans occupied 
Smolensk area from July 1941 to September 1943. On 13 April, 1943, the 
radio in Berlin announced that mass Polish graves had been discovered 
in Katyn49. Since the end of March the Germans had been carrying out 
exhumations under the direction of Professor Gerhard Buhtz, the director of 
Forensic Medicine and Criminology Institute in Breslau (Wroclaw after the 
war). Further lists containing the names of the identified victims started to 
appear in the Polish-language German newspapers which were published in 
the General Government. Immediately, Stalin accused the Germans of this 
mass murder50.
The Germans tried to make use of the facts revealed, and on 16 April 
they invited the International Red Cross and chose inhabitants of the General 
Government to participate in the exhumations and examinations51.
The next day, General Sikorski’s government asked the International Red 
Cross for help with the examination; they did this independently of the German 
appeal, but Stalin used this as an excuse to accuse the Polish government-in-
Sprawa mordu katyńskiego. Ta książka była pierwsza, Londyn 2009, pp. 87–104 (Katyn 
– ungesühntes Verbrechen, Zurich 1949; The Katyn Wood Murders, London 1951); W. Anders, Bez 
ostatniego rozdziału. Wspomnienia z lat 1939–1946, part 1, Lublin 1988, pp. 85–89, 119; J. Czapski, 
Na nieludzkiej ziemi, Kraków 2011, pp. 71–72, 88–101, 137–183 (The Inhuman Land, London 1987; 
La terre inhumaine, Lausanne 1979, Unmenschliche Erde Frankfurt a.M 1969) oraz Prawda 
o Katyniu, in: Na nieludzkiej ziemi, Kraków 2011, pp. 361, 365–361; J. K. Zawodny, Death in the 
Forest. The Story of Katyn Forest Massacre, London 1971, pp. 6–11; A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, 
Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 178–195; T. Snyder, Skrwawione ziemie, 
Warszawa 2011, pp. 174–175 (T. Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin, New York 
2010); A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 198–211 (Katyn: 
Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991).
49 Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów (including the foreword by general W. Anders), 
Londyn 1980, pp. 85 (The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents, London 1989); J. K. Zawodny, 
Death in the Forest. The Story of Katyn Forest Massacre, London 1971, p. 15; J. Mackiewicz, 
Sprawa mordu katyńskiego. Ta książka była pierwsza, Londyn 2009, pp. 106–108 (Katyn 
– ungesühntes Verbrechen, Zurich 1949; The Katyn Wood Murders, London 1951).
50 Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów (including the foreword by general W. Anders), 
Londyn 1980, p. 86 (The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents, London 1989); A. Paul, Katyń. 
Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 239–240 (Katyn: Stalin’s massacre and 
the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991); J. Mackiewicz, Sprawa mordu katyńskiego. Ta 
książka była pierwsza, Londyn 2009, pp. 109–111 (Katyn – ungesühntes Verbrechen, Zurich 1949; 
The Katyn Wood Murders, London 1951).
51 W. Materski, Katyń. Od kłamstwa ku prawdzie, Warszawa 2012, pp. 81–88.
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exile of collaboration with the Third Reich. This was the way in which the 
official Soviet newspaper Pravda (Truth) described the attitude of the Polish 
authorities. On 25 April, 1943, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Molotov, 
gave the Polish ambassador in Moscow a note saying that the USSR government 
had decided to ‘break off the relations with the Polish government’52.
Meanwhile, the International Red Cross replied that it would explain the 
circumstances of the executions on condition that all the parties concerned 
asked it to discover the truth. Moscow refused to participate. Thus, the 
Germans invited an independent committee consisting of 12 leading specialists 
in forensic medicine from the whole of Europe to the place of the massacre. 
The experts were in Katyn from 28 to 30 April. The statement that the experts 
issued dispelled all the doubts as to who was responsible for the massacre, 
namely, the executions took place at the time when Smolensk area was under 
the Soviet rule53.
At the same time the Technical Committee of the Polish Red Cross worked 
under the leadership of general secretary of the Polish Red Cross executive 
board Kazimierz Skarzynski. The committee consisted, among others, of the 
following people: Dr Marian Wodzinski, an expert in forensic medicine from 
Jagiellonian University, and priest Stanislaw Jasinski, the representative of 
Metropolitan Bishop of Krakow sent by the Church. The Polish government 
and secret authorities allowed another group of Polish people to go to Katyn. 
Among them were the writers: Ferdynand Goetel and Jozef Mackiewicz.
The German version of the events was supported by different circumstances, 
for instance the age of the trees planted on the graves before 1941, so the 
massacre must have been carried out by the Soviets, and also specific changes 
in the state of the corpses due to which it was possible to say that they had been 
there since 1940.
By 3 June, 1943 over 4,100 bodies had been removed, and Dr Wodzinski 
identified 2,800 of them. After the delegation arrived in the General Government, 
the Germans tried to force the Polish Red Cross to issue an announcement 
52 Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945, T. Pełczyński ed. et al., vol. 2: Czerwiec 1941–
kwiecień 1943, Wrocław 1990, pp. 505–509; Zbrodnia katyńska w świetle dokumentów (including 
the foreword by general W. Anders), Londyn 1980, p. 94 (The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents, 
London 1989); A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2010, pp. 245–250 
(Katyn: Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991).
53 J. K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story of Katyn Forest Massacre, London 1971, 
pp. 16–17; A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 
290–293.
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about Katyn, but the Poles did not want to be used for the purposes of German 
propaganda54.
10. Extermination and repressions of the Poles in the Third Reich
While the NKVD was killing Polish captives, the Germans were putting their 
carefully prepared plan to destroy Polish intellectual elite into action. As early 
as during the September campaign in 1939, six special squads (Einsatzgruppen) 
of Security Police (SiPo) and Security Service (SD) and an independent 
operational office were to perform an action against the Polishness. The aim of 
the actions code-named Tannenberg was to garrison Polish territories captured 
by the Wehrmacht55. The purpose of Intelligenzaktion56, part of which was 
Tannenberg, was to exterminate or send to labour camps all the people around 
whom an opposition against German oppression could be formed. The action 
was performed by Einsatzgruppen and, from November 1939, by permanent 
police outposts and Security service. As early as during the September 
campaign in 1939, they killed about 20,000 people considered enemies of the 
Third Reich, who were, among others, the participants of Silesian uprisings and 
Wielkopolska uprising.
On 6 November, 1939, a few days after the General Government was 
established from four districts: Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, Krakow (Galicia 
and Lwów (Lviv) were annexed in 1941), the Germans intensified the 
Intelligenzaktion operation. One of its parts was Sonderaktion Krakau 
(German: special action Krakow), which ended by arresting 183 people, for 
example, 144 academics from Jagiellonian University, 21 from AGH University 
54 J. Mackiewicz, Sprawa mordu katyńskiego. Ta książka była pierwsza, Londyn 2009, pp. 
147–171 (Katyn – ungesühntes Verbrechen, Zurich 1949; The Katyn Wood Murders, London 1951); 
J. Czapski, Prawda o Katyniu, in: Na nieludzkiej ziemi, Kraków 2011, pp. 370–372; F. Goetel, 
Czasy wojny, Gdańsk 1990, pp. 104–105; J. K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story of Katyn 
Forest Massacre, London 1971, pp. 17–25; A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, 
Warszawa 2010, pp. 231–237 (Katyn: Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New 
York 1991).
55 More in: A. Spiess, H. Lichtenstein, Akcja „Tannenberg“. Pretekst do rozpętania II wojny 
światowej, Warszawa 1990 (Unternehmen Tannenberg 1979) and J. Böhler, K. M. Mallmann, 
J. Matthäus: Einsatzgruppen w Polsce, Warszawa 2009.
56 The description of the whole action is fully presented in the following paper: M. Wardzyńska, 
Był rok 1939 Operacja niemieckiej policji bezpieczeństwa w Polsce. Intelligenzaktion, Warszawa 
2009.
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of Science and Technology, 3 from Business Academy, 1 person from Catholic 
University of Lublin, and 1 person from Stefan Batory University in Wilno 
(Vilnius). The scholars were transported to Sachsenhausen concentration 
camp57.
One of the parts of Intelligenzaktion was also an action called Akcja AB 
(Außerordentliche Befriedungsaktion – German: extraordinary action of 
pacification; AB Action), which was carried out in the General Government 
especially intensively from April till July 1940. The aim of the action was to 
destroy the communities capable of organizing resistance: teachers, doctors, 
Catholic priests, judges, political and social activists and those suspected of 
participating in underground organisations. About 3,500 Polish people were 
killed then58. By July 1940, over 100,000 teachers, priests, landowners, lawyers, 
retired military men, political and social activists had become victims of 
Intelligenzaktion.
The matters related to the exchange of people between the territories 
occupied by the Germans and the Soviets and presumably the destruction 
of Polish elites were discussed during mutual conferences organized by the 
Gestapo and NKVD in Zakopane and Krakow between February and April 
194059.
11. Katyn lie
The situation on the eastern front made Germany try to reconcile with the 
Poles. The massacre discovered by the Germans was to be used for disgracing 
Stalin, and consequently, making the anti-German coalition break up or at 
57 More in: Podstępne uwięzienie profesorów Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego i Akademii 
Górniczej (6 XI 1939 r.). Dokumenty, comp. J. Buszko, I. Paczyńska, Kraków 1995; J. August, 
Sonderaktion Krakau. Die Verhaftung der Krakauer Wissenschaftler am 6. November 1939, 
Hamburg 1997; A. K. Banach, J. Dybiec, K. Stopka, The History of Jagiellonian University, 
Kraków 2000, pp. 193–195.
58 Ausserordentliche Befriedungsaktion 1940. Akcja AB na ziemiach polskich, (the materials 
from the symposium (6–7 November 1986 r.). the introd. Z. Mańkowski, ed., Warszawa 1992. (The 
Introduction by Z. Mańkowski presents the whole action, the articles describe the action in different 
parts of Poland); Zagłada polskich elit. Akcja AB – Katyń, A. Piekarska, ed., Warszawa 2009, 
(katalog wystawy) also available at www.pamiec.pl/portal/pa/1506/10757/Zaglada_polskich_elit_
Akcja_AB__Katyn.html
59 L. R. Coatney, The Katyn Masacre: An Assessment of its Significance as a Public and 
Historical Issue in the United States and Great Britain, 1993, p. 19.
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least weaken. The governments of the USA and Great Britain knew the truth, 
but were not interested in giving it wide publicity because this threatened the 
alliance with Moscow against the war with Hitler60.
Stalin used Polish communists for his purposes: on 28 April, 1943, Wanda 
Wasilewska accused Germany of committing the crime. She did this in her 
speech, which was later published in Izvestia. Next the leadership of Polish 
Workers’ Party did the same61.
In January 1944, the Soviets made another attempt to distort the truth: 
Special Committee under the leadership of Nikolay Burdenko went to 
Smolensk district, which was recaptured in September 1943. They carried out 
“re-assessment” for a few days in January 1944, and stated that the Germans 
were responsible for the massacre. It was then that a documentary and a report 
for the communist propaganda were produced. Again, Polish communists 
supported the Soviets: Wanda Wasilewska and Jerzy Borejsza spread 
Burdenko’s version in the Soviet press. Zygmunt Berling, the commander of 
the First Polish Army organized by Stalin, did the same62.
When the Germans left Krakow, retreating from the Red Army, the 
NKVD started to search for the people participating in the exhumation 
and examination of the evidence discovered in the death pits in Katyn. 
In March 1945, Dr Jan Robel and his co-workers were arrested. They had 
been examining the things dug up in Katyn and delivered to Krakow. In 
June public prosecution service accused, among others, writer, Ferdynand 
Goetel, and Dr Marian Wodzinski of collaborating with the Germans. Public 
prosecutor, Roman Martini, headed the investigation, and public prosecutor, 
Jerzy Sawicki, supervised it. Arrest warrants were issued for the witnesses, 
who first hid and then ran away abroad63.
60 Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New 
Haven 2007, pp. 215–222, 305–310.
61 P. Łysakowski, Kłamstwo katyńskie, Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, no. 5–6, 2005, 
pp. 87–88; J. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story of Katyn Forest Massacre, New York 1988, 
p. 38; A. Paul, Katyń. Stalinowska masakra i tryumf prawdy, Warszawa 2003, p. 216 (Katyn: 
Stalin’s massacre and the Seeds of Polish Resurrection, New York 1991).
62 W. Wasilewski, Kłamstwo katyńskie – narodziny i trwanie, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. 
W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, pp. 69–83; Katyn. A Crime 
Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, pp. 
226–229, 319–326.
63 W. Wasilewski, Kłamstwo katyńskie – narodziny i trwanie, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. 
W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, p. 84; Katyn. A Crime Without 
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In 1946, the Soviets unsuccessfully tried to include German war criminals in 
Nuremberg in the arraignment concerning killing “about 11,000 Polish officers 
in Katyn in 1941”. In the final document this matter was omitted. The reason 
was that it had unquestionably been established that the unit indicated by the 
Soviet prosecutor, the staff of the 537 building battalion under the leadership 
of Colonel Ahrens, was stationed in the barracks a few kilometres from Katyn 
graves, but only from December 1941. Colonel Ahrens testified in Nuremberg 
as a witness64.
The authorities in Moscow tried to hide the truth for many years. Aleksander 
Szelepin, the chief of the Committee for State Security (KGB), suggested 
destroying the captives’ files to the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, in 1959. 
The files “were kept in a sealed chamber”. According to the Russian sources, 
Khrushchev was to keep only the most important documents, which were 
hidden in a special file labelled number 165.
Katyn matter reappeared during the Cold War. In 1951, the US House of 
Representatives established a committee under the leadership of Ray John 
Madden. The investigation conducted by the committee met with strong 
opposition from the USSR and People’s Republic of Poland authorities. The 
report issued in July 1952 placed the blame unambiguously on the Soviets66.
In 1969, Ukrainian children accidentally found graves in Piatykhatky. The 
chief of KGB (Committee for State Security) and a future leader of the USSR, 
Jurij Andropov, ordered that the Poles’ remains be covered by slaked lime 
Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds. New Haven 2007, pp. 222–226, 
233–234; R. Kotarba, Śledztwo czy mistyfikacja?, in: Stanisław M. Jankowski, R. Kotarba, Literaci 
a sprawa katyńska – 1945, Kraków 2003, pp. 81–132; J. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story 
of Katyn Forest Massacre, New York 1988, p. 172.
64 D. Gabrel, Historia postępowań w sprawie Zbrodni Katyńskiej, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. 
W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, pp. 23–24; Katyn. A Crime 
Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, pp. 228–
235, 326–330; J. Zawodny, Death in the Forest. The Story of Katyn Forest Massacre, New York 
1988, pp. 59–76.
65 S. Kalbarczyk, Zbrodnia Katyńska po 70 latach: krótki przegląd ustaleń historiografii, in: 
Zbrodnia Katyńska. W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, p. 20; Katyn. 
A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, 
pp. 240–241, 332–334.
66 W. Wasilewski, Kongres USA wobec Zbrodni Katyńskiej (1951–1952), in: Zbrodnia 
Katyńska. W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, pp. 89–108; Katyn. 
A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, 
pp. 235–239, 330.
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and buried. The documents describing these facts were found in 2009 by the 
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU)67.
In the 1970s, Moscow propaganda gave considerable publicity to the 
massacre of Belarusian people conducted by Germans in Chatyn in 1941. The 
similarity between the names of the places and their close location were used in 
order to mislead the western public opinion. A lot of politicians put flowers at 
the monument during their official visits to the USSR68.
After a short period of polemics with the Commission of the House of 
Representatives, silence followed – mentioning the word “Katyn” publicly was 
forbidden. It was not until the mid-seventies that the censorship in the People’s 
Republic of Poland allowed printing expressions like “shot by the Nazis in 
Katyn”’ or “was killed in Katyn”. The only date which could be given was the 
one after July 1941. At the same time, those who told the truth were punished. 
In the international area, the authorities of the USSR and People’s Republic of 
Poland opposed, among other things, the building of monuments reminding 
people of the Katyn massacre69.
Many years after the USSR officially accepted the responsibility for the 
Katyn crime, books denying the truth have been and still are being published 
in Russia. For example, Antirossijskaja podłost by Jurij Muchin was published 
in 2003. It spread the old lies about the Germans being to blame. Muchin 
also accused the Polish government in-exile of lengthening World War II and 
killing millions of people by revealing the crime. The consequence of the 
long-standing propaganda is the publication of the information about ‘the 
German crime in Katyn’ in the western press. One of the examples is the 
announcement of the film entitled Katyn by Andrzej Wajda, which appeared 
in a Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter. In 2008, the newspaper printed 
67 Dokumenty dotyczące Zbrodni Katyńskiej przekazane do IPN przez Służbę Bezpieczeństwa 
Ukrainy, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, 
pp. 231–236.
68 Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New 
Haven 2007, p. 241.
69 W. Wasilewski, Kłamstwo katyńskie – narodziny i trwanie, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. W kręgu 
prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, pp. 85–87; P. Gasztold-Seń, Siła przewciw 
prawdzie. Represje aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL wobec osób kwestionujących oficjalną wersję 
Zbrodni Katyńskiej, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., 
Warszawa 2010, pp. 132–153; P. Łysakowski, Kłamstwo katyńskie, Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci 
Narodowej, no. 5–6, 2005, pp. 89–93; Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, 
N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New Haven 2007, pp. 239–245; 334–337.
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the information about ‘a Nazi massacre of the Polish officers in Katyn forest 
in 1940’70.
12. The guardians of memory
Stanisław Swianiewicz was transported with others prisoners by train from 
Kozelsk to Gniezdovo, near Katyn forest on 29 April, 1940. Arrested in the 
carriage, he saw through the slit Soviet buses transporting the other officers in 
the unknown direction. He was kept in other prisons, and finally freed under 
the terms of Sikorski-Majski pact. He reached the place where the Polish Armed 
Forces in the USSR were being formed, and he presented a detailed report. In 
1951, he testified before a special committee of the US House of Representatives. 
His book In the Shadow of Katyn: Stalin’s terror71, which was published by the 
Literary Institute in Paris in 1976, contains his memories from the time when 
he was in gulags, prisons, and also the Embassy in Kuybyshev in 1942 when 
the Polish authorities were searching for traces of the 15,000 missing officers 
and policemen.
Jozef Czapski presented an account of his search for the missing officers in 
Wspomnienia Starobielskie (Reminiscences of Starobyelsk (1945)72 and later in 
the book In Inhuman Land73(1949).
In the People’s Republic of Poland, there were people who took a risk in order 
to preserve the memory of the NKVD victims. In 1978, Adam Macedonski, 
Andrzej Kostrzewski, Stanislaw Tor, Kazimierz Godlowski and Leszek Martini 
established a secret Katyn Institute in Poland74. In April 1979, just before the 
70 N. S. Lebiediewa, 60 lat fałszowania i zatajania historii Zbrodni Katyńskiej, „Zeszyty 
Katyńskie” no. 12, Warszawa 2000, p. 121; P. Łysakowski, Kłamstwo katyńskie, Biuletyn Instytu- 
tu Pamięci Narodowej, no. 5–6, 2005, p. 94; www.wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,11488 
1,4958005.html (Accessed 03.04.2013).
71 S. Swianiewicz, W cieniu Katynia, Paryż 1976. (S. Swianiewicz, In the Shadow of Katyn: 
Stalin’s terror, Pender Island 2002).
72 J. Czapski, Wspomnienia starobielskie 2011 (J. Czapski, Souvenirs de Starobielsk, Paris 
1987; J. Czapski, Ricordi di Starobielsk, Roma 1945.
73 J. Czapski, Na nieludzkiej ziemi, Instytut Literacki 1969 (J. Czapski, The Inhuman Land, 
Londyn 1987; J. Czapski, La terre inhumaine. Adapté du pol., Lausanne 1979; J. Czapski, 
Unmenschliche Erde Frankfurt a.M 1969).
74 Instytut Katyński, in: Wspomnienia Adama Macedońskiego, założyciela KPN, www.bibula.
com/?p=8571; Pierwsze nadanie Medalu Dnia Pamięci Ofiar Zbrodni Katyńskiej 8 kwietnia 
2008 r., „Zeszyty Katyńskie” (2008), no. 24, pp. 253–255.
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39th anniversary of the tragedy, they revealed themselves. Until that time the 
members of the Institute had translated foreign language publications, among 
others, reports produced by ambassador O’Maley and by a special committee 
of the US Congress. They had also prepared the first 15 issues of the magazine 
„Biuletyn Katynski” („Katyn Bulletin”)75. The founders and co-workers of the 
Institute faced prosecutions and reprisals from the Security Service. The Institute 
was officially registered as Katyn Institute in Poland in 199176.
Priest Stefan Niedzielak and Wojciech Ziembinski started to create the 
Sanctuary of the Killed and Murdered in the East in Powazki Cemetery. Stefan 
Niedzielak was the chaplain of Home Army, a participant of the Warsaw Uprising 
and, from 1977, parish priest in Powazki Cemetery. He worked as the chaplain 
of families, which, in the 1980s, started to demand that the truth be revealed 
after half a century silence. On 31 July, 1981, the monument – Katyn cross – was 
erected on his initiative. The monument was destroyed on the same night by the 
Security Service. The Security Service threatened the priest in order to silence 
him. On the night of 19/20 January 1989, the priest died after receiving a blow to 
the head. His killers have still not been found 77.
On 21 March, 1980, Walenty Badylak, a 76-year-old retired baker living 
in Krakow, set himself on fire in protest against communism and concealing 
the truth about Katyn. According to „Biuletyn Katyński”78, the files of the 
investigation into ‘committing suicide by Walenty Badylak, who was suspected 
of the crime under article 152 of the penal code’ were kept in the archives in 
Krakow District Prosecution Service. Article 15 of the penal code at that time 
imposed a custodial sentence from 6 months to 5 years for ‘manslaughter’, which 
was the way the communist prosecution service classified self-immolation. 
Walenty Badylak died from burns before the fire was extinguished. A metal 
plate with the word ‘Katyn’ was found with his body79.
75 A. Kostrzewski, Stanisław M. Jankowski, Biuletyn Katyński, „Zeszyty Katyńskie” (1995), 
no. 5, pp. 150–155.
76 A. Macedoński, Historia Instytutu Katyńskiego w Polsce, „Zeszyty Katyńskie” (1996), 
no. 6, Warszawa 1996, pp. 188–192.
77 P. Niedzielak, Ostatnia ofiara Katynia: w świetle faktów i dokumentów, Warszawa 1991; 
P. Litka, Katyński kurier, „Tygodnik Powszechny”, 18 I 2009.
78 Śmierć przy studzience, comp. S. M. Jankowski, „Biuletyn Katyński” (1991), no. 1, p. 8–17.
79 M. Lewandowski, M. Gawlikowski, Prześladowani, wyszydzani, zapomniani... 
Niepokonani, Vol. I. ROPCiO i KPN w Krakowie 1977–1981, Kraków 2009; M. Majewski, Badylak. 
Żywa pochodnia rozświetlająca prawdę o Katyniu, www.fronda.pl/a/badylak-zywa-pochodnia-
rozswietlajaca-prawde-o-katyniu,5746.html?page=2&.
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13. Revealing the evidence about the crime by Moscow  
and reluctance to judge it
Political changes after the year 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 created – as it seemed then – an opportunity to begin a Polish investigation. 
However, the authorities in Warsaw decided that the investigation was within 
the jurisdiction of the law enforcement authorities of the country where the 
crime was committed. Public Prosecutor General, Jozef Zyto, applied to the 
USSR authorities to launch an investigation into the matter of Polish officers. 
After the initial refusal, the investigation was eventually undertaken in 199080.
It was on 13 April that the Soviet Union admitted for the first time that 
the massacre in Katyn was committed by the NKVD. In October 1992, the 
director of the Russian Federation State Archives, Rudolf Pikhoya, submitted 
the copies of the documents from the special file on the crimes committed 
in Katyn, Kharkiv and Kalinin (Tver). The documents were submitted to 
President Lech Walesa by the order of Russian President, Boris Yeltsin81.
The public opinion could read the interrogation protocols of several 
participants of the massacre called by the Russian law enforcement agencies 
to testify as witnesses. However, after a few years, the Russian Federation 
hardened its position and on 5 March, 2005, the Chief Military Prosecution 
Service announced that it had completed the investigation into the massacre 
on 21 September, 2004. On 11 March, 2005, the Chief Military Prosecution 
Service justified its decision by stating that killing Polish officers did not bear 
the stamps of genocide, but it was a common crime, so it expired. 116 out 
of 184 volumes of the investigation, including the decision of 21 September, 
2004, were made confidential under the regulation of 21 December, 2004. 
Consequently, the files cannot be used, for example by Polish prosecutors82. 
80 D. Gabrel, Historia postępowań w sprawie Zbrodni Katyńskiej, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. 
W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, pp. 24–27; A. Przewoźnik, 
J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, p. 440.
81 A. Przewoźnik, J. Adamska, Katyń. Zbrodnia. Prawda. Pamięć, Warszawa 2010, pp. 449–
453; Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment, A. M. Cienciala, N. Lebedeva, W. Materski, eds., New 
Haven 2007, pp. 251–257, 344–348.
82 D. Gabrel, Historia postępowań w sprawie Zbrodni Katyńskiej, in: Zbrodnia Katyńska. 
W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010, pp., 40–41; Polish researchers, 
law theorists and public prosecutors deny this statement, refer to, among others, to articles in: 
Zbrodnia Katyńska. W kręgu prawdy i kłamstwa, S. Kalbarczyk, ed., Warszawa 2010: M. Kuźniar-
Plota, Kwalifikacja prawna Zbrodni Katyńskiej – wybrane zagadnienia, pp. 42–51; W. Kulesza, 
91
Monika Komaniecka, Krystyna Samsonowska, Mateusz Szpytma, Anna Zechenter
Katyn Massacre – Basic Facts
This met with a strong reaction from the family members of the victims, who 
having exhausted legal proceedings, lodged a few complaints to the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in the years 2007–2010. They demanded, 
among other things, that the justification of discontinuation of the Russian 
investigation be available to them because they did not accept the conclusion 
announced publicly by Russian prosecutors. The Russian reply was that they 
were under no obligation to explain what had happened to the Polish citizens 
who, according to them, ‘went missing’ ‘as a result of Katyn events’83.
Those complaints were handled together in the first instance by the 
European Court of Human Rights on 16 April, 2012. The judges decided that 
the crime in Katyn was a war crime, which does not expire. The Court also 
maintained that Russia treated the victims’ family members, who wanted to 
gain access to the documents, ‘inhumanely and humiliatingly’ by making the 
documents classified or not showing where the killed officers had been buried. 
Russia was also accused of making the documents unavailable to the European 
Court of Human Rights. Consequently, the Court was unable to decide whether 
the investigation was conducted thoroughly. The victims’ family members 
appealed against the sentence to the Grand Chamber. Supported by the state 
they challenge the decision of the Court that it was not able to examine whether 
the Russian investigation into Katyn massacre had been effective. The verdict 
is expected to be announced by the end of 201384.
Zbrodnia Katyńska jako akt ludobójstwa (geneza pojęcia), pp. 52–67; I. C. Kamiński, „Skargi 
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On 30 November, 2004, the Institute of National Remembrance (the IPN) 
launched an investigation within its power to prosecute war crimes and crimes 
against mankind (including those committed by the communist regime) from 
the period between 1939 and 1990. The decision to launch the investigation was 
based on the assumption that Katyn Massacre was a war crime and a crime 
against mankind85.
By the end of 2012, 2,887 witnesses had been questioned, the majority 
of whom were the members of the victims’ families. The documents from 
the archives and public prosecution services had been gathered. While the 
prosecutors of the IPN were in Moscow in 2005, only 67 out of 183 volumes 
of the files of the investigation conducted by the Chief Military Prosecution 
Service of the Russian Federation were available to them for inspection. 
Although some of the documents were gradually declassified in the following 
years, there were 35 volumes of files at the end of 2012, which were still 
classified. These are probably fragments of the investigation and the decision 
to discontinue it. The Polish investigation is still being conducted86.
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